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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate secure and reliable
transmission strategies for multi-cell multi-user massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) systems with a multi-antenna
active eavesdropper. We consider a time-division duplex system
where uplink training is required and an active eavesdropper
can attack the training phase to cause pilot contamination at
the transmitter. This forces the precoder used in the subsequent
downlink transmission phase to implicitly beamform towards the
eavesdropper, thus increasing its received signal power. Assuming
matched filter precoding and artificial noise (AN) generation at
the transmitter, we derive an asymptotic achievable secrecy rate
when the number of transmit antennas approaches infinity. For
the case of a single-antenna active eavesdropper, we obtain a
closed-form expression for the optimal power allocation policy for
the transmit signal and the AN, and find the minimum transmit
power required to ensure reliable secure communication. Fur-
thermore, we show that the transmit antenna correlation diversity
of the intended users and the eavesdropper can be exploited
in order to improve the secrecy rate. In fact, under certain
orthogonality conditions of the channel covariance matrices,
the secrecy rate loss introduced by the eavesdropper can be
completely mitigated.
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of smart mobile devices such as smart
phones and wireless modems has led to an exponential in-
crease in the demand for wireless data services. A recent and
promising solution to meet this demand is massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) technology, which utilizes a
very large number of antennas and simple signal processing
at the base station (BS) to serve a comparatively small (with
respective to the number of antennas) number of users. The
field of massive MIMO communication systems was initiated
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by the pioneering work in [1] which considered multi-cell
multi-user time-division duplex (TDD) communication. The
key idea in [1] is that as the number of transmit antennas
increases, the effects of uncorrelated receiver noise and fast
fading vanish due to the law of large numbers. Then, the
only residual interference is caused by the reuse of the same
pilot sequences in adjacent cells. This effect is known as pilot
contamination. Since the publication of [1], a considerable
amount of research has been dedicated to studying various
aspects of massive MIMO systems [2–10]. In particular, A.
Adhikary et al. and C. Sun et al. design transmission schemes
to serve different users in orthogonal spatial resources by
exploiting the unique property of the massive MIMO chan-
nels in [4] and [8], respectively, which inspire a null space
design for secure massive MIMO transmission in this paper.
Also, massive MIMO has been investigated for various types
of systems, including: Single-cell multi-user uplink/downlink
systems [11–13], multi-cell multi-user uplink/dowlink systems
[14, 15], orthogonal frequency-division multiple access sys-
tems [16–18], non-orthogonal multiple access systems [19],
and systems employing constant-envelope signals [20].
The broadcast nature of the wireless channel makes it
inherently prone to security breaches such as eavesdropping
and jamming, which jeopardizes the privacy of communication
in wireless networks. In order to maintain the required level
of privacy, appropriate signal and information processing tech-
niques have to be employed to ensure reliable and secure com-
munication. Traditional approaches to secure communication
for preventing unauthorized reception by eavesdroppers rely
on cryptographic encryption implemented in the application
layer. These methods may entail a relatively high complexity
due to the required key distribution and service management
[21]. As a complement to cryptographic methods, physical
layer security, which considers communication security from
an information-theoretic perspective, has attracted significant
research interest recently. In Wyner’s pioneering work on
information-theoretic security, a “wiretap channel” model
was defined along with the associated secrecy capacity [22].
Wyner’s work indicates that the transmitter can reliably send
a private message to the receiver, which cannot be decoded by
the eavesdropper, if the channel of the eavesdropper is a de-
graded version of the channel of the desired receiver. Wyner’s
result was extended to more general non-degraded channels
in [23]. More recent studies have investigated the capacity
and precoder design for multi-antenna wiretap channels [24–
32]. In particular, if only imperfect channel state information
(CSI) of the eavesdropper is available at the transmitter, it is
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2advantageous to transmit artificial noise (AN) along with the
information-carrying signal to interfere the decoding process
at the eavesdropper [33–36]. In [37], the authors propose a
thorough analysis and optimization framework for artificial
noise assisted secure transmission in a MIMO wiretap channel.
Physical layer security for massive MIMO systems with
passive eavesdroppers has been recently studied. The authors
in [39] first applied the technique of large-scale antenna
array into physical layer security, and investigate the limiting
performance while the number of antennas approached infinity.
Secure massive MIMO transmissions for multi-cell multi-
user systems with imperfect CSI have been investigated in
[40, 41], where a passive eavesdropper attempts to decode
the information sent to one of the users. In [42], a com-
prehensive performance analysis of AN aided multi-antenna
secure transmission in multi-cell multi-user systems under a
stochastic geometry framework is provided. In [39–42], it was
assumed that the channel gains of both the desired receiver and
the eavesdropper are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.).
Most existing studies on physical layer security assume
that perfect CSI of the legitimate channel is available at the
transmitter and do not consider the channel training phase
required to acquire the CSI. However, in TDD communication
systems, the BS needs to estimate the channel for the subse-
quent downlink transmission based on pilot sequences sent by
the users in an uplink training phase. Furthermore, the low
rank property of massive MIMO channels has been exploited
in [38] to significantly save the pilot training overhead and
reduce the signal processing complexity at users to achieve
reliable CSI at the BS. As a result, a smart eavesdropper might
actively attack this channel training phase by sending the same
pilot sequences as the users to cause pilot contamination at
the transmitter, which improves the eavesdropping capability
of the eavesdropper significantly [43].
Hence, the so-called pilot contamination attack poses a se-
rious secrecy threat to TDD-based massive MIMO systems. In
such systems, the channel hardening due to beamforming with
large antenna arrays [2] makes the exploitation of statistical
fluctuations due to fading for secrecy enhancement impossi-
ble. Furthermore, the pilot contamination attack directs the
transmitter beamforming to the advantage of the eavesdropper.
Therefore, for a sufficiently large eavesdropper pilot power, the
achievable secrecy rate may approach zero. This goes against
the conventional wisdom [5] that massive MIMO inherently
facilitates secure communication because the base station can
form very narrow beams focusing on the target users and
therefore avoiding spill over of the signal power in other
directions.
A single cell massive MIMO system with an active eaves-
dropper was investigated for i.i.d. fading channels [44–46].
However, systematic approaches for combating the pilot con-
tamination attack of a multi-antenna active eavesdropper and
maintaining secrecy of communication in correlated fading
channels were not provided in [44–46] and have not been
studied in the literature, yet.
In this paper, we study secure transmission over correlated
fading channels in TDD multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO
systems in the presence of a multi-antenna active eavesdropper.
We assume that in the uplink training phase, the active
eavesdropper sends the same pilot sequence as the desired
receiver to impair the channel estimation at the transmitter, i.e.,
to cause pilot contamination at the transmitter. Subsequently,
the transmitter uses the estimated channel for calculation of
the precoder for downlink transmission. This paper makes the
following key contributions:
1) We introduce a pilot contamination precoder, which
allows the eavesdropper to optimize its attack. The
proposed pilot contamination precoder is provided in
closed form and maximizes the total average estimation
error variance of the desired user’s channel.
2) We derive a closed-form expression for the asymp-
totic achievable secrecy rate for TDD multi-cell multi-
user massive MIMO systems employing matched filter
precoding and AN generation (we refer to this de-
sign as MF-AN design) at the transmitter to combat a
multi-antenna active eavesdropper. Based on the derived
asymptotic expression, which is valid if the number of
transmit antennas tends to infinity, the optimal power
allocation policy for the information signal and the AN
can be found by a simple one-dimension numerical
search. Then, we show that, in the presence of an active
eavesdropper, the secrecy rate is not a monotonically
increasing function of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
For the special case of a single-antenna eavesdropper,
we obtain the optimal power allocation policy for the
transmit signal and the AN in closed form. In addition,
we obtain the minimum transmit signal power required
to ensure secure transmission.
3) For the case of correlated fading channels, we reveal
that the impact of the active eavesdropper vanishes when
the signal space (i.e., the span of the eigenvectors of
the channel correlation matrix that correspond to non-
zero eigenvalues) of the users and the eavesdropper are
mutually orthogonal. Inspired by this observation, we
exploit the low rank property of the transmit correlation
matrices of massive MIMO channels [3, 4, 6–8, 10, 38]
to design an efficient precoding scheme that transmits
in the null space (NS) of the transmit correlation matrix
of the eavesdropper (we refer to this precoding solution
as NS design). Unlike the conventional NS design for
the perfect CSI case [24], the proposed NS design can
completely remove the impact of the pilot contamina-
tion attack by performing joint uplink and downlink
processing. For the special case of a single-antenna
eavesdropper, we derive a threshold that can be used
to determine whether the MF-AN design or the NS
design is preferable for given channel and eavesdropper
parameters.
4) We propose a unified design which combines the MF-
AN design and the NS design. Numerical results indicate
that the proposed unified design can effectively mitigate
the pilot contamination attack of an active eavesdropper
in massive MIMO systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
3Section II, we introduce the adopted multi-cell multi-user
massive MIMO system model with a multi-antenna active
eavesdropper. In Section III, we derive an expression for the
asymptotic achievable secrecy rate for the MF-AN design
when the number of transmit antennas tends to infinity. Based
on this expression, we derive transmission strategies to combat
the pilot contamination attack from the active eavesdropper. In
Section IV, we provide several novel insights for the single-
antenna eavesdropper case. Numerical results are presented in
Section V, and the main results are summarized in Section VI.
Notation: Vectors are denoted by lower-case bold-face let-
ters; matrices are denoted by upper-case bold-face letters.
Superscripts (·)T , (·)∗, and (·)H stand for the matrix transpose,
conjugate, and conjugate-transpose operations, respectively.
We use tr(A) and A−1 to denote the trace operation and the
inverse of matrix A, respectively. ‖ · ‖ and | · | denote the
Euclidean norm of a matrix/vector and a scalar, respectively.
diag {b} denotes a diagonal matrix with the elements of vector
b on its main diagonal. vec (A) stacks all columns of matrix
A into a vector. The M×M identity matrix is denoted by IM ,
and the all-zero M ×N matrix and N × 1 vector are denoted
by 0. The field of complex numbers is denoted by C and
E [·] denotes statistical expectation. We use x ∼ CN (0,RN )
to denote a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector
x ∈ CN×1 with zero mean and covariance matrix RN . Based
on [49, Definition II.1], we use X ∼ CN (0,RN ⊗RM )
to denote a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian matrix
X ∈ CN×M with zero mean and covariance matrix RN⊗RM .
{A}ij returns the element of matrix A in the ith row and the
jth column. 1N denotes an N × 1 vector with all elements
equal to 1. er denotes the unit-vector with a one as the rth
element and zeros for all other elements. [x]+ stands for
max {0, x}, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, and AN→∞→ B
means that A converges almost surely to B as N goes to
infinity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-cell multi-user system with L + 1
cells, cf. Figure 1. Each cell contains a BS equipped with
Nt antennas and K single-antenna users. Without loss of
generality, we denote the reference cell by l = 0. An active
eavesdropper with Ne antennas (equivalent to Ne coopera-
tive single-antenna eavesdroppers) is located in the reference
cell. The eavesdropper seeks to recover the private message
intended for a specific target user m.
A. Uplink Training and Channel Estimation
In the uplink training and channel estimation phase, the
received signal Y0 ∈ CNt×τ at the BS in the reference cell is
given by [3]
Y0 =
K∑
k=1
√
P0kh
0
0kω
T
0k +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plkh
0
lkω
T
lk
+
√
PE
Ne
H0EPeWe + N. (1)
Here, Plk and ωlk ∈ Cτ×1 are the average transmit power
and the pilot sequence of the kth user in the lth cell,
where τ denotes the length of the pilot sequence. hplk =
(Rplk)
1/2
gplk ∈ CNt×1 denotes the channel vector between
the kth user in the lth cell and the BS in the pth cell, where
gplk ∼ CN (0, INt) and Rplk ∈ CNt×Nt is the correlation
matrix of channel hplk. PE denotes the average transmit
power of the eavesdropper when attacking the uplink training.
HlE =
(
RlE,T
)1/2
GlE
(
RlE,R
)1/2 ∈ CNt×Ne denotes the
channel between the eavesdropper and the BS in the lth
cell, where GlE ∼ CN (0, INt ⊗ INe). RlE,T ∈ CNt×Nt and
RlE,R ∈ CNe×Ne are the transmit and receive correlation
matrices of channel HlE . The active eavesdropper attacks the
channel estimation process of the mth user in the reference
cell by sending pilot contamination sequences PeWe, where
Pe ∈ CNe×Ne is the pilot contamination precoder and
We = [ω0m,ω0m, · · · ,ω0m]T ∈ CNe×τ . N ∈ CNt×τ is a
Gaussian noise matrix with i.i.d. elements of zero-mean and
variance N0. The structure of the uplink received signal at the
BS in the local cell is illustrated in Figure 2.
Eq. (1) can be rewritten as
y0 =
K∑
k=1
√
P0k (ω0k ⊗ INt) h00k
+
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plk (ωlk ⊗ INt) h0lk
+
√
PE
Ne
(ω0m ⊗ INt)
Ne∑
r=1
h0eff,r + n, (2)
where y0 = vec (Y0), n = vec (N), and hleff,r denotes the
rth column of matrix HlEPe, l = 0, 1, · · · , L. We assume
that the same K orthogonal pilot sequences are used by the
K users in each cell [1], i.e., ω0k = ω1k = · · · = ωLk = ωk,
ωHlkωlk = τ,ω
H
lkωlp = 0, ∀k 6= p. Then, the minimum mean
square error (MMSE) estimate of h00m is given by [50]
ĥ00m =
√
P0mR
0
0m
(
N0INt+τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtmR
0
tm
+PEr
0
E,RR
0
E,T
))−1
y˜0m, (3)
where
y˜0m =
√
P0mτh
0
0m +
L∑
t=1
√
Ptmτh
0
tm
+
√
PE
Ne
τ
Ne∑
r=1
h0eff,r + (ωm ⊗ INt)Hn (4)
and rlE,R =
1
Ne
∑Ne
r=1
∑Ne
s=1
{
PHe R
l
E,RPe
}
rs
, l =
0, 1, · · · , L. The actual channel vector h00m can be writ-
ten as h00m = ĥ
0
0m + e
0
0m, where the estimated chan-
nel ĥ00m ∼ CN
(
0, R̂00m
)
and the estimation error e00m ∼
CN
(
0,R00m − R̂00m
)
are mutually independent. Correlation
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Fig. 1: Model of considered multi-cell massive MIMO system.
matrix R̂00m is given by
R̂00m = P0mτR
0
0m
×
(
N0INt + τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtmR
0
tm + PEr
0
E,RR
0
E,T
))−1
R00m.
(5)
Similarly, the MMSE channel estimates for the mth user and
the kth user, k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, k 6= m, in the lth cell, l =
0, 1, · · · , L, are given by
ĥllm =
√
PlmR
l
lm
×
(
N0INt + τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tm + PEr
l
E,RR
l
E,T
))−1
y˜lm,
(6)
y˜lm =
√
Plmτh
l
lm +
L∑
t=0,t6=l
√
Ptmτh
l
tm
+
√
PE
Ne
τ
Ne∑
r=1
hlE,r + (ωm ⊗ INt)Hn (7)
and
ĥllk =
√
PlkR
l
lk
(
N0INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
y˜lk, (8)
y˜lk =
√
Plkτh
l
lk +
L∑
t=0,t6=l
√
Ptmτh
l
tk + (ωk ⊗ INt)Hn,
(9)
respectively. Furthermore, the correlation matrices of ĥllm and
ĥllk are obtained as
R̂llm = PlmτR
l
lm
×
(
N0INt + τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tm + PEr
l
E,RR
l
E,T
))−1
Rllm
(10)
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Fig. 2: Structure of uplink received signal at the BS in the local cell.
and
R̂llk = PlkτR
l
lk
(
N0INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
Rllk, (11)
respectively.
Remark 1: We assume that the correlation matrices Rltm
of the users and rlE,RR
l
E,T of the eavesdropper are perfectly
known at the legitimate transmitter, see (3), (6), (8). In
this context, we note that for massive MIMO systems, it is
reasonable to assume that the statistical CSI of the users of the
system is known at the BS [3, 47]. Hence, our system model
is applicable to the case where the BS attempts to transmit a
private message to some users while treating the other users
as eavesdroppers, i.e., the eavesdropper is an idle user of the
system. Therefore, the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper can
be assumed to be known. Nevertheless, the assumption that
the statistical CSI of the active eavesdropper is available at
the transmitter may also be reasonable if the eavesdropper
is not an idle user. In particular, we can obtain E
[
y˜lmy˜
H
lm
]
by averaging y˜lm over different data slots. Eq. (7) suggests
that E
[
y˜lmy˜
H
lm
]
is the sum of the correlation matrices of
all users, the eavesdropper, and the noise. Then, rlE,RR
l
E,T
can be obtained by subtracting the correlation matrices of the
legitimate users and the noise from E
[
y˜lmy˜
H
lm
]
.
Remark 2: For conventional massive MIMO systems with
pilot contamination but without active eavesdropping [1, 2],
the term PEr0E,RR
0
E,T is not present in (3). In this case, the
BS can employ a user scheduling scheme [3, 6] to control
the pilot contamination and reduce the impact of PtmR0tm
in (3). However, this is not possible for active eavesdropping
and the term PEr0E,RR
0
E,T in (3) can not be avoided. This is
an important difference between conventional massive MIMO
systems and the system considered in this paper.
The eavesdropper can optimize its pilot contamination
precoder Pe to conduct a best possible attack. Since the
precoder is computed based on the estimated channel, the
leakage of the desired signal will increase when the channel
estimation error increases. Therefore, from the eavesdropper’s
perspective, the pilot contamination attack should impair the
accuracy of the channel estimation as much as possible. As
a result, the eavesdropper should optimize Pe such that the
total average estimation error tr
(
R00m − R̂00m
)
is maximized.
From (5), we observe that the total average estimation error
tr
(
R00m − R̂00m
)
is a monotonically increasing function of
r0E,R. Hence, maximizing r
0
E,R is desirable. Therefore, finding
the pilot contamination precoder Pe amounts to solving the
following optimization problem
max
Pe
Ne∑
r=1
Ne∑
s=1
{
PHe R
0
E,RPe
}
rs
(12)
s.t. tr
(
PeWeW
H
e P
H
e
) ≤ Neτ.
Let Pe = [p1,p2, · · · ,pNe ], where ps ∈ CNe×1 is the sth
column of Pe. Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The optimal pilot contamination precoder Pe
which solves (12) has to satisfy the following condition
Ne∑
s=1
ps =
√
Neue (13)
where ue ∈ CNe×1 is the eigenvector corresponding to the
largest eigenvalue of R0E,R.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 1 indicates that transmitting the pilot sequence
along the direction of the eigenvector corresponding to the
maximum eigenvalue of the receive correlation matrix of the
6eavesdropper’s channel constitutes the best possible attack
strategy from the eavesdropper’s point of view.
B. Downlink Data Transmission
For the data transmission phase, we assume that the BSs
in all L+ 1 cells perform jamming to prevent eavesdropping
in their own cells. Then, the transmit signal in the lth cell,
l = 0, 1, · · · , L, is given by
xl =
√
P
(
√
p
K∑
k=1
wlkslk +
√
qUnull, lzl
)
, (14)
where P is the average transmit power for downlink
transmission, slk is the transmit signal for the kth user in the
lth cell with E
[|slk|2] = 1, and p and q denote the fractions
of power allocated to transmit signal and AN, respectively.
To avoid the high implementation complexity associated with
the matrix inversion required for zero forcing and MMSE
precoding [48], in this paper, we adopt simple matched filter
precoding, as is typical for massive MIMO systems [1, 2,
40]. Thus, we set wlk =
ĥllk
‖ĥllk‖ for the precoding vector of
the kth user in the lth cell. Furthermore, in (14), Unull, l
and zl ∼ CN (0, INt) denote the AN shaping matrix and
the AN vector in the lth cell, respectively. We introduce
Ĥll =
[
ĥll1, ĥ
l
l2, · · · , ĥllK
]
for notational simplicity. If the AN
shaping matrix is chosen as the NS of Ĥll as is conventionally
done [33], for each new channel estimate, a matrix inversion is
needed to compute the AN shaping matrix. This leads to a high
implementation complexity considering the large numbers of
antennas in massive MIMO. Thus, to keep the implementation
complexity low despite the large numbers of antennas, we
adopt for the AN shaping matrix the asymptotic NS of
Ĥll. In particular, since based on [52, Corollary 1] we have
1
Nt
(
Ĥll
)H
Ĥll
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
diag
[
tr
(
R̂ll1
)
,tr
(
R̂ll2
)
,· · · ,tr
(
R̂llK
)]
,
we set Unull, l = INt −
Ĥlldiag
[
tr
(
R̂ll1
)−1
, tr
(
R̂ll2
)−1
, · · · , tr
(
R̂llK
)−1](
Ĥll
)H
.
It can be shown that [52, Corollary 1]
1
Nt
tr
(
Unull, lU
H
null, l
)Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
(Nt −K). (15)
Based on (14), (15), and the expression for wlk, we set Kp+
(Nt −K)q = 1 to ensure xHl xl
Nt→∞→ P .
The received signals at the mth user in the reference cell,
y0m, and at the eavesdropper, yeve ∈ CNe×1, are given by
y0m =
L∑
l=0
(
hl0m
)H
xl + n0m (16)
and
yeve =
L∑
l=0
(
HlE
)H
xl + neve, (17)
respectively. Here, n0m and neve ∈ CNe×1 are zero-mean
Gaussian noise processes with variance N0,d and covariance
matrix N0,dINe , respectively. We define the signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) for downlink data transmission as γ = P/N0,d.
The structure of the downlink received signal at the desired
user and the eavesdropper is illustrated in Figure 3.
In order to illustrate the secrecy threat that the pilot contam-
ination attack poses for massive MIMO systems, we simulate
the secrecy rate for MF precoding without AN generation1(i.e.,
p = 1, q = 0) in the following example.
Example 1: Let Nt = 128, Ne = 1, L = 3, K = 5,
Plk = 1, ∀k, ∀l, PE = 0.5, and N0 = 1. The achievable
ergodic secrecy rate [40] of a massive MIMO system with
MF precoding without AN generation is shown in Table I for
i.i.d. fading and different SNR values.
The results in Table I reveal that even if the pilot power
of the eavesdropper is only half of the pilot power of the
desired user and the eavesdropper has only a single antenna,
zero secrecy rate may result.
III. MASSIVE MIMO SIGNAL DESIGN FOR COMBATING
THE PILOT CONTAMINATION ATTACK
In this section, we investigate three signal designs for com-
bating the pilot contamination attack by an active eavesdropper
in a multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO system.
A. MF-AN Design
An achievable ergodic secrecy rate of the massive MIMO
system described in Section II is given by [40]
Rsec = [R0m − Ceve]+, (18)
where R0m and Ceve denote an achievable ergodic rate be-
tween the BS and the mth user and the ergodic capacity be-
tween the BS and the eavesdropper in the 0th cell, respectively.
The achievable ergodic rate R0m is given by [40, Eq. (8)]
R0m = E [log2 (1 + SINR0m)] (19)
where SINR0m is given by
SINR0m =
pγ
∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0m∣∣∣2
A
(20)
A = pγ
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0k∣∣∣2 + qγ∣∣∣(h00m)HUnull, 0∣∣∣2
+pγ
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣(hl0m)Hwlk∣∣∣2+qγ L∑
l=1
∣∣∣(hl0m)HUnull, l∣∣∣2+1.
(21)
In this paper, we make the pessimistic assumption that
the eavesdropper has perfect knowledge of its own channel
and is able to decode and cancel the signals of all intra-
cell and inter-cell users from the received signal yeve in
(17) except for the signal intended for the mth user in the
0th cell. This assumption results in an upper bound on the
eavesdropper’s capacity, and consequently, in a lower bound
on the ergodic secrecy rate. If the eavesdropper has access
to the data of all intra-cell and inter-cell interfering users,
1MF precoding without AN generation is often adopted in massive MIMO
systems without secrecy consideration [1, 2].
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Fig. 3: Structure of the downlink received signal for the desired user and the eavesdropper.
TABLE I: The achievable secrecy rate for different SNR values.
γ (dB) −10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0
Secrecy Rate (b/s/Hz) 0.3828 0.4097 0.3807 0.2759 0.0822 0
this low bound is achievable. This might be the case if the
interfering users cooperate with the eavesdropper. We note that
this assumption constitutes a worst-case scenario. Hence, if
secure communication can be achieved for this worst case,
then secure communication can also be achieved for more
optimistic settings (e.g. when the eavesdropper cannot mitigate
all multi-user interference). Considering the worst case, Ceve
can be expressed as [40, Eq. (7)]
Ceve
= E
[
log2
(
1 + pγ(w0m)
H
H0EQ
−1(H0E)Hw0m)]
= E
log2
1 + pγ∥∥∥ĥ00m∥∥∥2
(
ĥ00m
)H
H0EQ
−1(H0E)H ĥ00m

 ,
(22)
where
Q = qγ
L∑
l=0
(
HlE
)H
Unull, lU
H
null, lH
l
E + INe (23)
denotes the noise correlation matrix at the eavesdropper.
In the following theorem, we provide an asymptotic achiev-
able secrecy rate expression when the number of transmit
antennas Nt tends to infinity. For convenience, the notation
used in the theorem is summarized in Table II.
Theorem 2: An asymptotic achievable secrecy rate for a
multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO system employing the
MF-AN design to overcome a multi-antenna active eavesdrop-
per is given by
Rsec, asy
Nt→∞→ [log2 (1 + SINR0m, asy)
−log2 (1 + SINReve, asy)]+ , (24)
8TABLE II: Notation used in Theorem 2.
Notation Description
SINR0m, asy Output SINR of the desired user in the asymptotic regime Nt →∞
SINReve, asy Output SINR of the eavesdropper in the asymptotic regime Nt →∞
θm Power of signal intended for the mth user in the 0th cell received by the desired user
θb,p Power of multi-user interference at the desired user
θb,q Power of the AN at the desired user
Λl0m Power of the signal intended for the mth user in the lth cell received at the desired user
Qasy Power of AN received at the eavesdropper
η0ij Power of the signal intended for the mth user in the 0th cell received at the eavesdropper
ηlij Power of the signal intended for the mth user in the lth cell received at the eavesdropper
where
SINR0m, asy =
pγθm
pγθb,p + qγθb,q + 1
, (25)
SINReve, asy =
pγθe
tr
(
R̂00m
) , (26)
with
θm = tr
(
R̂00m
)
+tr
(
R̂00m
)−1
tr
((
R00m − R̂00m
)
R̂00m
)
(27)
θb,p =
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1
tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
+
L∑
l=1
tr
(
R̂llm
)−1
Λl0m (28)
θb,q =
L∑
l=0
tr
(
Rl0m
)− L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1
tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
−
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R̂llm
)−1
Λl0m. (29)
Here, Λl0m in (28) and (29) is given by
Λl0m = τ
2P0m
∣∣tr (CllmRl0m)∣∣2+τN0tr(Rl0mCllm(Cllm)H)
+ τ2
L∑
t=1
Ptmtr
(
Rl0mC
l
lmR
l
tm
(
Cllm
)H)
+ τ2PEr
0
E,Rtr
(
Rl0mC
l
lmR
l
E,T
(
Cllm
)H)
(30)
Cllm =
√
PlmR
l
lm
×
(
N0INt + τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm + PEr
l
E,RR
l
E,T
))−1
. (31)
Furthermore, θe in (26) is given by
θe =
Ne∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
{
Q−1asy
}
ij
η0ij , (32)
where
ηlij = τ
2
{
RlE,R
}
ij
L∑
t=0
Ptmtr
(
RlE,TC
l
lmR
l
tm
(
Cllm
)H)
+ τ2
PE
Ne
Ne∑
r=1
{
RlE,R
}
ir
Ne∑
r=1
{
RlE,R
}
rj
∣∣tr (CllmRlE,T )∣∣2
+N0τ
{
RlE,R
}
ij
tr
(
RlE,TC
l
lm
(
Cllm
)H)
(33)
and Qasy = qγ
∑L
l=0 Ql + INr . Matrix Ql ∈ CNe×Ne has
elements
{Ql}ij =
{
RlE,R
}
ij
tr
(
RlE,T
)− [{RlE,R}ij
×
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1
tr
(
RlE,T R̂
l
lk
)
+ tr
(
R̂llm
)−1
ηlij
 .
(34)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 2 provides an expression for the general asymp-
totic achievable secrecy rate for Nt →∞, which is valid for
arbitrary p and q. In practice, the optimal p can be found by
performing a simple one dimensional numerical search in the
interval 0 ≤ p ≤ 1K for maximization of (24). For the special
case of a single-antenna eavesdropper, the optimal p can be
obtained in closed form, c.f. Section IV-A.
For the conventional secrecy problem existing in multiple-
input, single-output systems with multiple-antenna passive
eavesdroppers [24], the optimal transmission design does not
require AN generation and the secrecy rate increases for
increasing SNR. To illustrate the importance of AN generation
when an active eavesdropper is present, we introduce the
following theorem.
Theorem 3: For the case without AN generation where p =
1
K , Rsec, asy in (24) is a monotonically decreasing function of
γ for γ > γth, where
γth =
−θb,pθ˜e +
√
θ2b,pθ˜
2
e + (θb,p + θm)
(
θm − θ˜e
)
θb,pθ˜e
(θb,p + θm) θb,pθ˜e
(35)
with
θ˜e =
Ne∑
i=1
η0ii
tr
(
R̂00m
) . (36)
9Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Remark 3: Theorem 3 indicates that in the presence of
an active eavesdropper, the secrecy rate will decrease for
increasing SNR in the high SNR regime if all the available
power at the BS is allocated to the information-carrying
signals. This behaviour is very different from that of multiple-
antenna systems with passive eavesdroppers [24], where the
secrecy rate is a monotonically increasing function of the SNR
throughout the entire SNR region even if AN is not employed.
However, for the case considered in this paper, the BS relies
on estimated CSI for precoder design, which is contaminated
by the attack of the active eavesdropper. Since the BS cannot
distinguish the actual channel of the desired user from the
eavesdropper channel, the precoder may implicitly beamform
the information signal towards the eavesdropper. As a result,
the capacity of the eavesdropper may increase faster than
the achievable rate of the desired user as the transmit power
increases. Hence, it is advantageous if a fraction of power is
used to generate AN to degrade the eavesdropper’s ability to
decode the transmit signal intended for the desired user. This
is the motivation behind the MF-AN design.
B. NS Design
In order to obtain some insight for transmit signal de-
sign, in the following theorem, we investigate the asymptotic
achievable secrecy rate under the assumption that the transmit
correlation matrices of the users are orthogonal to the transmit
correlation matrices of the eavesdropper. The notations used
in the following theorem are summarized in Table III, where
the subscript “orth” in the variable names indicates that the
transmit correlation matrices of the users are assumed to
be orthogonal to the transmit correlation matrices of the
eavesdropper.
Theorem 4: If
∑L
t=0 tr
(
RltmR
l
E,T
)
= 0 for l =
0, 1, · · · , L, the secrecy rate Rsec, asy is identical to the
achievable rate of the desired user Rsec, asy, orth = log2(1 +
SINR0m, asy, orth), where
SINR0m, asy, orth =
pγθm,orth
pγθb,p,orth + qγθb,q,orth + 1
(37)
with
θm,orth = tr
(
R̂00m,orth
)
+ tr
(
R̂00m,orth
)−1
tr
((
R00m − R̂00m,orth
)
R̂00m,orth
)
(38)
θb,p,orth =
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1
tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
+
L∑
l=1
tr
(
R̂llm,orth
)−1
Λl0m,orth (39)
θb,q,orth =
L∑
l=0
tr
(
Rl0m
)
−
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1
tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
−
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R̂llm,orth
)−1
Λl0m,orth (40)
Λl0m,orth = τ
2P0m
∣∣tr (Cllm,orthRl0m)∣∣2
+ τ2
L∑
t=1
Ptmtr
(
Rl0mC
l
lm,orthR
l
tm
(
Cllm,orth
)H)
+ τN0tr
(
Rl0mC
l
lm,orth
(
Cllm,orth
)H)
(41)
Cllm,orth =
√
PlmR
l
lm
(
N0INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm
)−1
(42)
R̂llm,orth = PlmτR
l
lm
(
N0INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm
)−1
Rllm.
(43)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
Theorem 4 reveals that when the channels of the eaves-
dropper and the users are statistically orthogonal, the pilot
contamination attack has no impact on the secrecy rate. It is
known that for typical massive MIMO scenarios, the transmit
correlation matrices of the channels are low rank [3, 4, 6–8,
10, 38]. Hence, inspired by Theorem 4, in the remainder of
this subsection, we introduce an NS based design where the
information-carrying signal is transmitted in the NS of the
transmit correlation matrix of the eavesdropper’s channel HlE .
Assume the rank of RlE,T is Tl, l = 0, 1, · · · , L. Let us
construct a matrix VlE ∈ CNt×Ml , whose Ml columns are
the Ml eigenvectors corresponding to the zero eigenvalues of
RlE,T , where Ml = Nt − Tl. In the uplink training phase, we
multiply Yl with VlE to obtain
2
(
VlE
)H
Yl =
K∑
k=1
√
Plk
(
VlE
)H
hllkω
T
k
+
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plk
(
VlE
)H
hllkω
T
k
+
√
PE
(
VlE
)H
HlEPeWe +
(
VlE
)H
N (44)
2The mth user in the lth cell (l = 1, 2, · · · , L) is also affected by the pilot
sequence sent by the active eavesdropper in the reference cell. As a result,
we assume that the lth BS also employs the NS design to combat the pilot
contamination attack.
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TABLE III: Notation used in Theorem 4.
Notation Description
SINR0m, asy, orth Output SINR of the desired user in the asymptotic regime Nt →∞
θm,orth Power of signal intended for the mth user in the 0th cell received by the desired user
θb,p,orth Power of multi-user interference at the desired user
θb,q,orth Power of the AN received at the desired user
Λl0m,orth Power of signal intended for the mth user in the lth cell received at the desired user
and
yl,null = vec
((
VlE
)H
Yl
)
=
K∑
k=1
√
Plk (ωk ⊗ INt) hllk,null
+
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
√
Plk (ωk ⊗ INt) hllk,null
+
√
PE
Ne
(ωm ⊗ INt)
Ne∑
r=1
hleff,r,null + n˜
l
null, (45)
where hllk,null =
(
VlE
)H
hllk ∼ CN
(
0,Rllk,null
)
, Rllk,null =(
VlE
)H
RllkV
l
E ∈ CMl×Ml , l = 0, 1, · · · , L, k =
1, 2, · · · ,K, and n˜lnull ∼ CN (0, τN0IMl). hleff,r,null is the
rth column of matrix
(
VlE
)H
HlEPe. We obtain an estimate
for hllm,null as
ĥllm,null =
√
PlmR
l
lm,null
×
(
N0IM + τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm,null
)−1
y˜lm,null, (46)
where
y˜lm,null =
√
Plmτh
l
lm,null +
L∑
t=1
√
Ptmτh
l
tm,null
+
√
PE
Ne
Ne∑
r=1
hleff,r,null + (ωm ⊗ IM )H n˜lnull. (47)
The actual channel vector can be expressed as hllm,null =
ĥllm,null + e
l
lm,null, where ĥ
l
lm ∼ CN
(
0, R̂llm,null
)
and
ellm,null ∼ CN
(
0,Rllm,null − R̂llm,null
)
with
R̂llm,null = PlmτR
l
lm,null
×
(
N0IM + τ
L∑
t=0
PtmR
l
tm,null
)−1
Rllm,null. (48)
In the downlink data transmission phase, we employ the
same transmission scheme as in Section II-B, but replace wlm
with wlm,null = VlE
ĥllm,null
‖ĥllm,null‖ , and set p = 1/K, q = 0.
Remark 4: The proposed NS design transmits the signal in
the orthogonal subspace V0E . As a result, the performance of
the NS design depends on the rank of V0E . For instance, for
the extreme case of i.i.d. fading, V0E does not exist and hence
the NS design is not applicable. In practice, the NS design
will be beneficial in highly correlated channels, for a strong
pilot contamination attack, and in the high SNR regime since
it can effectively degrade the eavesdropper’s performance in
these scenarios. In contrast, we expect the MF-AN design to
outperform the NS design in weakly correlated channels, for a
weak pilot contamination attack, and in the low SNR regime.
C. Unified Design
Considering Remark 4, we propose a unified design that
exploits the advantages of both the conventional MF-AN
design and the NS design. The corresponding transmit signal
in the lth cell, l = 0, 1, · · · , L, is given by
xl =
√
P
(
√
α
(
√
p
K∑
k=1
wlkslk +
√
qUnull,lzl
)
+
√
β
K
wlm,nullslk + K∑
k=1,k 6=m
wlkslk
 , (49)
where α and β denote the weights of the MF-AN design and
the NS design with α+ β = 1. Using the secrecy rate in (18)
as the cost function, the optimal α and β can be obtained from
a one-dimensional numerical search.
IV. THE SINGLE-ANTENNA EAVESDROPPER CASE
In this section, we analyze the performance of massive
MIMO systems for the case of an active single-antenna eaves-
dropper [43–45]. For the MF-AN design, we derive closed-
form expressions for the optimal power allocation policy for
the transmit signal and the AN as well as the minimum
transmit signal power required to ensure secure transmission.
Also, we derive a closed-form expression for a threshold that
can be used to optimally switch between the MF-AN and the
NS design. Finally, we investigate the single-cell single-user
massive MIMO system.
A. Multi-cell Multi-user Case
We obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal power
allocation for the MF-AN design in the following theorem.
The notation used in the theorem is summarized in Table IV.
Theorem 5: Let us define
p1 = − (a1c2 − a2c1)
a1b2 − a2b1
−
√
(a1c2 − a2c1)2 − (a1b2 − a2b1) (b1 − b2) c1
a1b2 − a2b1 (50)
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TABLE IV: Notations used in Theorem 5.
Notation Description
a1, b1, c1 a1p2 + b1p+ c1 is the numerator of the ratio between 1 + SINR0m, asy and 1 + SINReve, asy when Ne = 1
a2, b2, c2 a2p2 + b2p+ c2 is the denominator of the ratio between 1 + SINR0m, asy and 1 + SINReve, asy when Ne = 1
θe,e Power of the signal intended for the mth user in the 0th cell received at the eavesdropper when Ne = 1
θe,q Power of AN received at the eavesdropper when Ne = 1
ΛlE Power of the signal intended for the mth user in the lth cell received at the eavesdropper when Ne = 1
and
p2 = − (a1c2 − a2c1)
a1b2 − a2b1
+
√
(a1c2 − a2c1)2 − (a1b2 − a2b1) (b1 − b2) c1
a1b2 − a2b1 , (51)
where
a1 = −γ2 ((Nt −K) θm − (Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q)Kθe,q
(52)
b1 = γ ((Nt −K) θm + (Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q)
× (γθe,q +Nt −K)
+ γ (γθb,q +Nt −K) ((Nt −K) θe,q −Kθe,q) (53)
c1 = (γθb,q +Nt −K) (γθe,q +Nt −K) (54)
a2 = γ
2 ((Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q) ((Nt −K) θe,e −Kθe,q)
(55)
b2 = γ (γθb,q +Nt −K) ((Nt −K) θe,e −Kθe,q)
+ γ ((Nt −K) θb,p −Kθb,q) (γθe,q +Nt −K) (56)
c2 = (γθb,q +Nt −K) (γθe,q +Nt −K) , (57)
with
θe,e =
Λ0E
tr
(
R̂00m
) , (58)
θe,q =
L∑
l=0
tr
(
RlE,T
)− L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1
tr
(
RlE,T R̂
l
lk
)
−
L∑
l=0
tr
(
R̂llm
)−1
ΛlE (59)
and
ΛlE = τ
2PE
∣∣tr (CllmRlE,T )∣∣2+τN0tr(RlE,TCllm(Cllm)H)
+ τ2
L∑
t=0
Ptmtr
(
RlE,TC
l
lmR
l
tm
(
Cllm
)H)
. (60)
Then, the optimal power allocation p maximizing the asymp-
totic achievable secrecy rate in (24) for Ne = 1 is given in
(61) at the top of the next page, where Rsec, asy (p) is defined
in (24).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
A fundamental question in secure communication is under
which conditions a positive secrecy rate is achievable. For
massive MIMO systems under the pilot contamination attack,
this question is answered in the following theorem.
Theorem 6: For Ne = 1, to achieve Rsec, asy > 0 in (24),
the power allocated to the transmit signal must satisfy3:
p > − b1 − b2
a1 − a2 , if a1 − a2 > 0 (62)
p < − b1 − b2
a1 − a2 , if a1 − a2 < 0. (63)
Proof: Eqs. (62) and (63) can be obtained by following
a similar approach as in Appendix E and finding the solution
to 1+SINR0m, asy1+SINReve, asy > 1.
In the following, we derive a threshold which al-
lows us to determine whether the MF-AN design or the
NS design achieves a higher secrecy rate. Before pro-
ceeding, we introduce some definitions. Define a3 =
q∗θe,q (p∗θb,p + q∗θb,q + p∗θm), b3 = q∗θe,q + p∗θb,p +
q∗θb,q + p∗θm, a4 = (p∗θb,p + q∗θb,q) (p∗θe,e + q∗θe,q), b4 =
p∗θb,p + q∗θb,q + p∗θe,e + q∗θe,q , where p∗ and q∗ are the
optimal power allocation values obtained from Theorem 5,
a5 =
1
K (θb,p,null + θm,null), and a6 =
1
K θb,p,null, where
θm,null = tr
(
R̂00m,null
)
+ tr
(
R̂00m,null
)−1
tr
((
R00m,null − R̂00m,null
)
R̂00m,null
)
(64)
and
θb,p,null =
L∑
l=0
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1
tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
+
L∑
l=1
tr
(
R̂llm,null
)−1
Λl0m. (65)
Furthermore, define a7 = a3a6 − a4a5, b7 = a6b3 + a3 −
a5b4 − a4, c7 = a6 + b3 − a5 − b4, two fixed point equations
for γ
γ = min
[
−b7 +
√
b27 − 4a7c7
2a7
,
−b7 −
√
b27 − 4a7c7
2a7
]
(66)
γ = max
[
−b7 +
√
b27 − 4a7c7
2a7
,
−b7 −
√
b27 − 4a7c7
2a7
]
,
(67)
3When a1 − a2 = 0, if b1 − b2 > 0, then secure transmission can
be achieved for any p; otherwise, secure transmission cannot be achieved
regardless of the value of p.
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p∗ =

1, if p1 /∈ [0, 1] , p2 /∈ [0, 1] ,
arg max {Rsec, asy (1) , Rsec, asy (p1)} , if p1 ∈ [0, 1] , p2 /∈ [0, 1] ,
arg max {Rsec, asy (1) , Rsec, asy (p1)} , if p1 /∈ [0, 1] , p2 ∈ [0, 1] ,
arg max {Rsec, asy (1) , Rsec, asy (p1) , Rsec, asy (p2)} , if p1 ∈ [0, 1] , p2 ∈ [0, 1] ,
(61)
and ∆ = b27 − 4a7c7. We note that (66) and (67) are two
fixed point equations since a3, b3, a4, and b4 are functions
of γ. Denote the solution of (66) and (67) by γt, 1 and γt, 2,
respectively, and define
β (γ) =

1, if (∆ < 0 and a7 < 0) or
(∆ > 0, a7 > 0 and γt, 1 < γ < γt, 2) or
(∆ > 0, a7 < 0 and (γ < γt, 1 γ > ororγt, 2))
0, otherwise
(68)
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7: For Nt → ∞ and Ne = 1, if β (γ) = 0, the
asymptotic secrecy rate of the MF-AN design is higher than
that of the NS design; if β (γ) = 1, the opposite is true.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix F.
B. Single-Cell Single-User Case
To provide more insights into the impact of the pilot
contamination attack on secure communication in massive
MIMO systems, we simplify the system model to the single-
cell single-user case in this subsection. The transmitter (Alice)
sends the desired signal to the receiver (Bob), and an eaves-
dropper (Eve) is present to overhear the signal, i.e., we have
L = 0, K = 1, and Ne = 1 [24–26]. We investigate again
under which condition a positive secrecy rate is achievable.
With the simplified model, in the following theorem, we obtain
a more intuitive condition than the one in Theorem 6.
Theorem 8: For a single-cell single-user single-antenna
eavesdropper system (L = 0,K = 1, Ne = 1), to achieve
Rsec, asy > 0 in (24), the following condition must be satisfied:
(p− 1)γη1 < η2, (69)
where
η1 =
[(
tr2
(
R̂001
)
+ tr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
))
×
(
tr
(
R0E,T
)
tr
(
R̂001
)
− Λ
)
−
(
tr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
)
+ tr
(
R̂001
)
tr
(
R001 − R̂001
))
Λ
]
(70)
η2 =[(
tr2
(
R̂001
)
+ tr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
))
− Λ
]
tr
(
R̂001
)
(71)
Λ = τ2P 201tr
(
ΩHR0E,TΩR
0
01
)
+ τ2P01PE
∣∣tr (ΩR0E,T )∣∣2
+ τP01N0tr
(
ΩHR0E,TΩ
)
(72)
Ω = R001
(
N0INt + τ
(
P01R
0
01 + PER
0
E,T
))−1
. (73)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix G.
Remark 5: From (69), we obtain that coefficients η1 and
η2 determine whether secrecy can be achieved. In the high
SNR regime when γ →∞, if η1 > 0, (69) holds for arbitrary
p < 1 and secure communication can be achieved; if η1 < 0,
(69) holds only for p > 1. However, p denotes the fraction of
power allocated to the transmit signal and satisfies 0 < p ≤
1. This means that if η1 < 0, (69) can not hold and secure
communication can not be achieved.
In the following, we provide a concrete example for when
η1 < 0 may occur.
Theorem 9: Consider i.i.d. fading, i.e., R001 = β01INt and
R0E,T = βEINt , where β01 and βE denote the path-losses for
the desired user and the eavesdropper, respectively [43, 44].
Then, η1 ≷ 0 is equivalent to P01β01 ≷ PEβE .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix H.
Theorems 8 and 9 imply that if the active eavesdropper
increases the power of the pilot contamination attack, the
classical MF-AN design [40] may not be able to achieve secure
communication. Hence, a new design is needed to facilitate
secure communication in massive MIMO systems.
Remark 6: If η1 = 0 and η2 > 0, then (69) is always
satisfied. Hence, secure communication is achievable regard-
less of the pilot contamination power PE and SNR γ. The
question is how η1 = 0 and η2 > 0 can be achieved. Clearly,
in a conventional massive MIMO setting with i.i.d. channels,
as in [34], this condition is satisfied with low probability,
because for small-dimensional MIMO channels, both R001 and
R0E,T in (70) are full rank positive definite matrices, such
that η1 = 0 in (70) is difficulty to achieve. However, a
unique feature of massive MIMO channels is that the transmit
correlation matrices of the channels are low rank [3, 4, 6–8,
10, 38]. Therefore, for massive MIMO systems, it is possible
to perform joint uplink and downlink processing as in Section
III-B to project the channels of the users and the eavesdropper
into the null space of R0E,T . For this NS design, the condition
in (69) still holds after replacing R001 and R
0
E,T in (70) and
(71) with R001,null and 0, respectively. In this case, we obtain
η1 = 0 and η2 > 0. In fact, this is the intuition behind the
NS design proposed in this paper. Unlike the conventional NS
design for the perfect CSI case [24], the proposed NS design
transmits along the statistical eigen-direction of the channel.
Moreover, since the pilot contamination attack affects both the
uplink channel estimation and the downlink data transmission,
the proposed NS design requires a joint uplink and downlink
processing to completely eliminate the impact of the pilot
contamination attack, see Section III-B for details.
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V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate the
secrecy performance of the considered massive MIMO system
with an active eavesdropper. We consider a system where a
uniform linear array with Nt = 128 is employed at the BS, the
antenna spacing is half a wavelength, and the angle of arrival
(AoA) interval is A = [−pi, pi]. We use the truncated Laplacian
distribution to model the channel power angle spectrum as [51]
p (θ) =
1
√
2σ
(
1− e−
√
2pi/σ
)e−√2‖θ−θ‖σ , (74)
where σ and θ denote the angular spread (AS) and the mean
AoA of the channel, respectively. We assume that the AS
σ in (74) is identical for the channels of all users and the
eavesdropper and we set σ = pi/2. The channel transmit
correlation matrices of all users, Rllk, and the eavesdropper,
RlE,T , are generated based on [51, Eq. (3.14)]. For the channel
between the user and the BS in its own cell and the channel
between the user and the BSs in the other cells, we impose
a channel power normalization to make the trace of the
channel transmit correlation matrices equal to Nt and ρNt,
respectively, and set ρ = 0.1. The receive correlation matrices
of the eavesdropper, RlE,R, are generated using the exponential
correlation model
{
RlE,R
}
i,j
= ϕ|i−j|, ϕ ∈ (0, 1), where ϕ
is generated at random. We note that for any precoder Pe
satisfying (13), the resulting r0E,R in (3) and (5) is the same.
In the simulations, we set ps =
√
1
Ne
ue, s = 1, 2, · · · , Ne.
For the channel between the eavesdropper and the 0th BS
and the channel between the eavesdropper and the other BSs,
we impose a channel power normalization to make the trace
of the channel receive correlation matrices equal to Ne and
ρNe, respectively. The asymptotic secrecy rate is computed
based on Theorem 2 and the exact secrecy rate is obtained
by Monte Carlo simulation. We set L = 3, K = 5, Plk = 1,
k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, l = 0, 1, · · · , L, τ = 10, and N0 = 1. The
mean channel AoAs, θ, of all users and the eavesdropper in
(74) are generated at random and the channel AoAs, θ, of all
users and the eavesdropper are distributed within the angle
interval [−pi, pi] according to (74).
Figure 4 shows the secrecy rate performance versus (vs.)
SNR γ for the MF-AN design, PE = 1, different p, and
different Ne. We observe from Figure 4 that the asymptotic
secrecy rate in Theorem 2 provides a good estimate for the
exact secrecy rate. Also, we observe from Figure 4 that in
the low SNR regime, allocating more power (larger p) to the
information-carrying transmit signal leads to a higher secrecy
rate. However, as the SNR increases, the secrecy rate drops
significantly if the transmit signal power is high and the AN
power is small. For example, for SNR = 2 dB and Ne = 1,
we find from Theorem 6 that p < 0.15 is a necessary condition
to guarantee reliable communication. Thus, for p = 0.16,
a positive secrecy rate cannot be achieved, as confirmed by
Figure 4. In addition, we observe from Figure 4 that for
the MF-AN design, increasing Ne results in a secrecy rate
degradation.
Figure 5 shows the secrecy rate performance vs. p for the
MF-AN design, Ne = 1, PE = 1, and different SNRs. For
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Fig. 5: Secrecy rate vs. p for Ne = 1, PE = 1, and different
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K = 5, we know from Section II-B that 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.2.
Figure 5 confirms that the asymptotic secrecy rate in Theorem
2 provides a good estimate for the exact secrecy rate. Also,
we observe from Figure 5 that the maximum of the exact
secrecy rate is achieved for the optimal power allocation
solution provided in Theorem 5. Furthermore, for SNR = 4
dB, a positive secrecy rate cannot be achieved when p is
larger than the analytical transmit power threshold provided
in Theorem 6. As the SNR increases, more power has to be
used for generating AN, in order to achieve reliable secrecy
transmission.
Figure 6 shows the exact secrecy rate performance vs. SNR
γ for Ne = 1, PE = 1, and different system designs. For
the MF-AN design, we adopted the optimal power allocation
p and q based on Theorem 5. For the NS design, when an
eigenvalue of RlE,T is less than 10
−3, we treated it as being
equal to zero. Based on this, we obtained Tl and VlE according
to Section III-B. For the unified design, we obtained the
optimal α and β by performing a one-dimensional numerical
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search. For comparison, we also show results for a naive MF
precoding scheme, where p = 1/K and AN is not generated.
From Figure 6, we make the following observations: 1) The
unified design achieves the best performance for all considered
SNR values. 2) Because of the pilot contamination attack,
even though the transmitter is equipped with a large number
of antennas, naive MF precoding cannot achieve a positive
secrecy rate for moderate-to-high SNRs.
Figure 7 shows the exact secrecy rate performance vs. PE
for Ne = 1, γ = 10 dB, and different system designs. We
observe from Figure 7 that the unified design performs best
for all considered PE values. For a weak pilot contamination
attack, the MF-AN design performs better than the NS design.
However, when the eavesdropper increases its pilot power, this
leads to a serious secrecy rate loss for the MF-AN design, but
has barely any impact on the NS design. This is because the
NS design can eliminate the impact of the pilot contamination
caused by the active eavesdropper as suggested by (48) where
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Fig. 8: Exact secrecy rate vs. Ne for PE = 1, different
system designs, and different SNRs.
the term PER0E,T disappears in the covariance matrix of the
estimated channel. When PE = 0.1 and PE = 1, Theorem
7 indicates that, for γ = 10 dB, the MF-AN design and the
NS design perform better, respectively, which is confirmed by
Figure 7.
Figure 8 shows the exact secrecy rate performance vs. Ne
for PE = 1, different system designs, and different SNRs.
We observe from Figure 8 that the unified design performs
best for the considered SNR values. Also, the secrecy rate
of the unified design barely decreases with increasing Ne.
This confirms that the unified design is an effective approach
for combating the pilot contamination attack. In contrast,
the secrecy rate performance of the MF-AN design degrades
significantly with increasing Ne.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Prof. Xiqi Gao, Prof. C.
K. Wen, and Mr. Shahram Zarei for the helpful discussion
throughout the paper, Prof. Shi Jin for pointing out [44], and
Prof. Jiaheng Wang for the helpful discussion on Theorem 1.
The authors would also like to thank the editor, Prof. Yingbin
Liang, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and
suggestions that greatly improve the quality of the paper.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the transmit signal design for
multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO systems in the presence
of a multi-antenna active eavesdropper. For the MF-AN design,
we obtained an asymptotic achievable secrecy rate expression
for the pilot contamination attack when the number of transmit
antennas tends to infinity. Moreover, we proved that the impact
of the active eavesdropper can be completely eliminated when
the transmit correlation matrices of the users and the eaves-
dropper are orthogonal. This analytical insight motivated the
development of transmit signal designs that are robust against
the pilot contamination attack. Also, for the MF-AN design
and a single-antenna eavesdropper, we derived closed-form
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expressions for the optimal power allocation policy for the
information-carrying transmit signal and the AN as well as
the minimum transmit signal power required to ensure secure
transmission. In addition, for the single-antenna eavesdropper
case, a decision threshold for determining whether the MF-AN
design or the NS design is preferable was provided. Monte
Carlo simulation results showed that the derived analytical
results are accurate and confirmed the effectiveness of the
proposed transmission schemes for combating the pilot con-
tamination attack.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, recalling the definition of We, we have
WeW
H
e = τ1Ne1
T
Ne . (75)
Then, the constraint in (II-A) reduces to
tr
(
Pe1Ne1
T
NeP
H
e
)
= tr
( Nr∑
r=1
pr
)(
Nr∑
r=1
pr
)H ≤ Ne.
(76)
Also, (12) can be re-written as
Nr∑
r=1
Nr∑
s=1
{
PHe R
0
E,RPe
}
rs
=
Nr∑
r=1
Nr∑
s=1
eHr P
H
e R
0
E,RPees
=
Nr∑
r=1
Nr∑
s=1
pHr R
0
E,Rps
=
(
Nr∑
r=1
pHr
)
R0E,R
(
Nr∑
s=1
ps
)
.
(77)
Define p =
∑Ne
r=1 pr. Considering (76), (77), the optimization
problem in (12) is equivalent to
max
p
pHR0E,Rp (78)
s.t. tr
(
ppH
) ≤ Ne.
It is easy to show that the optimal solution of (78) is
p =
√
Neue, where ue is the eigenvector corresponding to
the largest eigenvalue of R0E,R. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, we calculate SINR0m in (20) for Nt → ∞. For the
numerator of (20), based on [52, Corollary 1], we have
1
Nt
[∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0m∣∣∣2]
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
∣∣∣ĥ00m∣∣∣2 + 1Nt

(
ĥ00m
)H (
R00m − R̂00m
)
ĥ00m∥∥∥ĥ00m∥∥∥2

Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
tr
(
R̂00m
)
+
1
Nt
tr
((
R00m − R̂00m
)
R̂00m
)
tr
(
R̂00m
) . (79)
For the denominator of (20), we have
1
Nt
∣∣∣(h00m)Hw0k∣∣∣2 =
(
h00m
)H
ĥ00k
(
ĥ00k
)H(
h00m
)
(
ĥ00k
)H
ĥ00k
Nt→∞→
(
ĥ00k
)H
R00mĥ
0
0k(
ĥ00k
)H
ĥ00k
Nt→∞→
tr
(
R00mR̂
0
0k
)
tr
(
R̂00k
) . (80)
Also, performing some simplifications, we obtain
1
Nt
[∥∥∥(h00m)HUnull, 0∥∥∥2]Nt→∞→ 1NtR00m
− 1
Nt
K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂00k
)−1(
h00m
)H (
ĥ00k
)(
ĥ00k
)H
h00m
− 1
Nt
tr
(
R̂00m
)−1(
h00m
)H (
ĥ00m
)(
ĥ00m
)H
h00m. (81)
For m 6= k, h00m is independent of ĥ00k. Hence, the asymptotic
expression for 1Nt
(
h00m
)H
ĥ00k
(
ĥ00k
)H
h00m is given by
1
Nt
(
h00m
)H
ĥ00k
(
ĥ00k
)H
h00m
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
tr
(
R00mR̂
0
0k
)
. (82)
For m = k, based on (3), we have
ĥ00m =
√
P0mτC
0
0mh
0
0m + C
0
0m
L∑
l=1
√
Plmτh
0
lm
+ C00m
√
PE
Ne
τ
Ne∑
r=1
h0E,r + C
0
0mΩmn, (83)
where C00m is defined in (31) and Ωm = (ωm ⊗ INt)H .
Based on (83), we obtain
(
h00m
)H
ĥ00m
(
ĥ00m
)H
h00m
=
(
h00m
)H
C00mΩmn
(
ĥ00m
)H
h00m + τ
2
(
h00m
)H
C00m
×
L∑
t=0
L∑
s=0
√
Ptm
√
Psmh
0
tm
(
h0sm
)H(
C00m
)H
h00m + τ
2
√
PE
Ne
× (h00m)HC00m L∑
t=0
√
Ptmh
0
tm
Ne∑
r=1
(
h0E,r
)H(
C00m
)H
h00m
+ τ
(
h00m
)H
C00m
L∑
t=0
√
Ptmh
0
tmn
HΩHm
(
C00m
)H
h00m
+ τ
√
PE
(
h00m
)H
C00m
Ne∑
r=1
h0E,r
(
ĥ00m
)H
h00m. (84)
When Nt → ∞, based on (84) and [52, Corollary 1], we
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have
1
Nt
(
h00m
)H
ĥ00m
(
ĥ00m
)H
h00m
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
τ2
(
h00m
)H
C00m
L∑
t=0
Ptmh
0
tm
(
h0tm
)H(
C00m
)H
h00m
+
1
Nt
τ2
PE
Ne
(
h00m
)H
C00m
Ne∑
r=1
h0E,r
Ne∑
r=1
(
h0E,r
)H (
C00m
)H
h00m
+
1
Nt
(
h00m
)H
C00mΩmn
(
C00mΩmn
)H
h00m
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
τ2P0m
(
h00m
)H
C00mh
0
0m
(
h00m
)H(
C00m
)H
h00m
+
1
Nt
τ2
(
h00m
)H
C00m
L∑
t=1
Ptmh
0
tm
(
h0tm
)H(
C00m
)H
h00m
+
1
Nt
τ2
PE
Ne
(
h00m
)H
C00m
Ne∑
r=1
h0E,r
Ne∑
r=1
(
h0E,r
)H (
C00m
)H
h00m
+
1
Nt
(
h00m
)H
C00mΩmn
(
C00mΩmn
)H
h00m
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
Λ00m.
(85)
Also, for m 6= k, hl0m is independent of ĥllk, and we obtain
in (21)
1
Nt
∣∣∣(hl0m)Hwlk∣∣∣2
=
1
Nt
(
hl0m
)H ĥllk∣∣∣ĥllk∣∣∣
(
ĥllk
)H∣∣∣ĥllk∣∣∣ hl0m
Nt→∞→
(
ĥllk
)H
Rl0mĥ
l
lk∣∣∣ĥllk∣∣∣2
Nt→∞→
tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
tr
(
R̂llk
) . (86)
For m = k, similar to (85), we have
1
Nt
∣∣∣(hl0m)Hwlm∣∣∣2 = 1Nt
(
hl0m
)H
ĥllm
(
ĥllm
)H
hl0m∣∣∣ĥllm∣∣∣2
Nt→∞→ 1
Nt
Λl0m
tr
(
R̂llm
) . (87)
Next, we simplify(
hl0m
)H
Unull, lU
H
null, lh
l
0m =
tr
(
Rl0m
)− K∑
k=1,k 6=m
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1(
hl0m
)H (
ĥllk
)(
ĥllk
)H
hl0m
− tr
(
R̂llm
)−1(
hl0m
)H (
ĥllm
)(
ĥllm
)H
hl0m. (88)
Following a similar approach as was used to obtain (82)
and (85), we obtain
1
Nt
(
hl0m
)H (
ĥllk
)(
ĥllk
)H
hl0m
Nt→∞→ tr
(
Rl0mR̂
l
lk
)
(89)
1
Nt
(
hl0m
)H (
ĥllm
)(
ĥllm
)H
hl0m
Nt→∞→ Λl0m. (90)
By substituting (79)–(90) into (20), we obtain the expression
for SINR0m, asy in (25).
Next, we simplify (22). First, we have
(
HlE
)H
Unull, lU
H
null, lH
l
E
=
(
HlE
)H (
INt − Ĥlldiag
[
tr
(
R̂ll1
)−1
,tr
(
R̂ll2
)−1
,· · · ,
tr
(
R̂llK
)−1](
Ĥll
)H)
HlE =
(
HlE
)H
HlE −QH (91)
where
QH =
(
HlE
)H
Ĥll
×diag
[
tr
(
R̂ll1
)−1
,tr
(
R̂ll2
)−1
,· · · ,tr
(
R̂llK
)−1](
Ĥll
)H
HlE .
(92)
For
(
HlE
)H
HlE , we have{(
HlE
)H
HlE
}
ij
=
(
hlE,i
)H
hlE,j
= eHi
(
RlE,R
)1/2(
GlE
)H(
RlE,T
)1/2
× (RlE,T )1/2GlE(RlE,R)1/2ej
= tr
(
eHi
(
RlE,R
)1/2(
GlE
)H(
RlE,T
)1/2
× (RlE,T )1/2GlE(RlE,R)1/2ej)
Nt→∞→ tr
((
RlE,R
)1/2
eje
H
i
(
RlE,R
)1/2)
tr
(
RlE,T
)
=
{
RlE,R
}
ij
tr
(
RlE,T
)
, (93)
where we used [53, Eq. (102)]. Then, performing some sim-
plifications, we get
{QH}ij =
K∑
k=1
tr
(
R̂llk
)−1(
hlE,i
)H (
ĥllk
)(
ĥllk
)H
hlE,j .
(94)
For m 6= k, hlE,i and hlE,j are independent of ĥllk. Thus, we
have
(
hlE,i
)H
ĥllk
(
ĥllk
)H
hlE,j =
(
ĥllk
)H
hlE,j
(
hlE,i
)H
ĥllk
Nt→∞→ tr
(
R̂llkh
l
E,j
(
hlE,i
)H)
=
(
hlE,i
)H
R̂llkh
l
E,j
= eHi
(
RlE,R
)1/2(
GlE
)H(
RlE,T
)1/2
R̂llk
× (RlE,T )1/2GlE(RlE,R)1/2ej
Nt→∞→ {RlE,R}ij tr(RlE,T R̂llk) , (95)
where (95) is obtained based on [52, Corollary 1] and [53, Eq.
(102)].
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For m = k, similar to (85), we have
(
hlE,i
)H
ĥllm
(
ĥllm
)H
hlE,j
Nt→∞→ τ2
L∑
t=0
Ptm
(
hlE,i
)H
Cllmh
l
tm
(
hltm
)H(
Cllm
)H
hlE,j
+ τ2
PE
Ne
Ne∑
r=1
Ne∑
t=1
(
hlE,i
)H
Cllmh
l
E,r
(
hlE,t
)H(
Cllm
)H
hlE,j
+
(
hlE,i
)H
CllmΩmnn
HΩHm
(
Cllm
)H
hlE,j . (96)
Then, based on [52, Corollary 1] and [53, Eq. (102)], we obtain
(
hlE,i
)H
Cllmh
l
E,r
(
hlE,t
)H(
Cllm
)H
hlE,j
= eHi
(
RlE,R
)1/2(
GlE
)H(
RlE,T
)1/2
×Cllm
(
RlE,T
)1/2
GlE
(
RlE,R
)1/2
er
× eHt
(
RlE,R
)1/2(
GlE
)H(
RlE,T
)1/2(
Cllm
)H
× (RlE,R)1/2GlE(RlE,T )1/2ej
Nt→∞→ {RlE,R}ir{RlE,R}tj tr (CllmRlE,T ) tr((Cllm)HRlE,T)
=
{
RlE,R
}
ir
{
RlE,R
}
tj
∣∣tr (CllmRlE,T )∣∣2. (97)
Similarly, we have
Ne∑
r=1
Ne∑
t=1
(
hlE,i
)H
Cllmh
l
E,r
(
hlE,t
)H(
Cllm
)H
hlE,j
Nt→∞→
Ne∑
r=1
{
RlE,R
}
ir
Ne∑
r=1
{
RlE,R
}
rj
∣∣tr (CllmRlE,T )∣∣2 (98)
(
hlE,i
)H
CllmΩmnn
HΩHm
(
Cllm
)H
hlE,j
Nt→∞→ N0τ
{
RlE,R
}
ij
tr
(
RlE,TC
l
lm
(
Cllm
)H)
. (99)
Combining (23), (91)–(99), we have
Q
Nt→∞→ Qasy. (100)
Based on (100), we obtain
wH0mH
0
EQ
−1(H0E)Hw0m
Nt→∞→ 1∥∥∥ĥ00m∥∥∥2
(
ĥ00m
)H
H0EQ
−1
asy
(
H0E
)H
ĥ00m, (101)
which can be further simplified using
1
Nt
∥∥∥ĥ00m∥∥∥2 Nt→∞→ 1Nt tr
(
R̂00m
)
(102)
and (
ĥ00m
)H
H0EQ
−1
asy
(
H0E
)H
ĥ00m
=
Ne∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
{
Q−1asy
}
ij
(
ĥ00m
)H (
h0E,i
)(
h0E,j
)H
ĥ00m
=
Ne∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
{
Q−1asy
}
ij
(
h0E,i
)H
ĥ00m
(
ĥ00m
)H
h0E,j
Nt→∞→
Ne∑
i=1
Ne∑
j=1
{
Q−1asy
}
ij
η0ij , (103)
which was obtained by following a similar approach as was
used to obtain (100). Substituting (102) and (103) into (22)
completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
When p = 1K ,
1+SINR0m, asy
1+SINReve, asy
can be simplified to
1 + SINR0m, asy
1 + SINReve, asy
=
γθb,p + γθm + 1
(γθb,p + 1)
(
γθ˜e + 1
) . (104)
The derivative of (104) with respect to γ is given by
d
(
γθb,p+γθm+1
(γθb,p+1)(γθ˜e+1)
)
dγ
=
− (θb,p + θm) θb,pθ˜eγ2 − 2γθb,pθm + θm − θ˜e
(γθb,p + 1)
2
(
γθ˜e + 1
)2 . (105)
From (27) and (28), we observe that θm ≥ 0 and θb,p ≥ 0.
Next, we prove θ˜e ≥ 0. From (33), we obtain
Ne∑
i=1
η0ii
= τ2
Ne∑
i=1
{
R0E,R
}
ii
L∑
t=0
Ptmtr
(
R0E,TC
0
0mR
0
tm
(
C00m
)H)
+ τ2
PE
Ne
∣∣tr (C00mR0E,T )∣∣2 Ne∑
i=1
Ne∑
r=1
{
R0E,R
}
ir
Ne∑
r=1
{
R0E,R
}
ri
+N0τ tr
(
R0E,TC
0
0m
(
C00m
)H) Ne∑
i=1
{
R0E,R
}
ii
. (106)
Since R0E,R is a receive correlation matrix, it is a Hermitian
positive-semidefinite matrix. Therefore, we have
{
R0E,R
}
ii
≥
0. As a result, we obtain
τ2
{
R0E,R
}
ii
L∑
t=0
Ptmtr
(
R0E,TC
0
0mR
0
tm
(
C00m
)H) ≥ 0
(107)
N0τ
{
R0E,R
}
ii
tr
(
R0E,TC
0
0m
(
C00m
)H) ≥ 0. (108)
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Also, we have
Ne∑
i=1
Ne∑
r=1
{
R0E,R
}
ir
Ne∑
r=1
{
R0E,R
}
ri
= 1HNeR
0
E,RR
0
E,R1Ne
=
(
R0E,R1Ne
)H
R0E,R1Nec
≥ 0 (109)
From (36), (106)–(109), we obtain θ˜e ≥ 0. As a result, the
equation
− (θb,p + θm) θb,pθ˜eγ2 − 2γθb,pθm + θm − θ˜e = 0 (110)
has at least one non-positive root. We assume that γ1 and
γ2, γ1 < γ2 are the two roots of (110) and γ1 ≤ 0. Since
− (θb,p + θm) θb,pθ˜e < 0, we have
1) When γ1 ≤ γ ≤ γ2,
− (θb,p + θm) θb,pθ˜eγ2 − 2γθb,pθm + θm − θ˜e ≥ 0.
2) When γ < γ1 or γ > γ2,
− (θb,p + θm) θb,pθ˜eγ2 − 2γθb,pθm + θm − θ˜e < 0.
Since γ1 ≤ 0, γ < γ1 can not hold. When γ > γ2, we know
from (105)
d
(
γθb,p+γθm+1
(γθb,p+1)(γθ˜e+1)
)
dγ
< 0. (111)
Finally, setting γth = γ2 in Theorem 3 completes the proof.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Since Rltm and R
l
E,T are positive semi-definite correla-
tion matrices,
∑L
t=0 tr
(
RltmR
l
E,T
)
= 0 is equivalent to∑L
t=0 R
l
tmR
l
E,T = 0. For
∑L
t=0 R
l
tmR
l
E,T = 0, we have
(112) at the top of the next page, where
(a)
= follows from
the matrix inversion lemma [54]. Similarly, we can prove that
when
∑L
t=0 R
l
tmR
l
E = 0, C
l
lm reduces to C
l
lm,orth.
Also, when
∑L
t=0 R
l
tmR
l
E,T = 0, we have
RlE,T
(
Cllm
)H
= RlE,TR
l
lm
(
INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
= 0,
(113)
and as a result,
tr
(
Rl0mC
l
lmR
l
E,T
(
Cllm
)H)
= 0, (114)
tr
(
RlE,TC
l
lm
(
Cllm
)H)
= 0, (115)
tr
(
RlE,TC
l
lm
)
= 0. (116)
Substituting (114) into (33), yields
ηlij = 0. (117)
The proof is completed by substituting (112)–(117) into (24).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
When Ne = 1, (26) reduces to
SINReve, asy =
pγθe,e
qγθe,q + 1
. (118)
Hence, maximizing Rsec, asy in (24) is equivalent to maximiz-
ing
1 + SINR0m, asy
1 + SINReve, asy
=
a1p
2 + b1p+ c1
a2p2 + b2p+ c2
. (119)
By taking the derivative of (119) with respect to p, we obtain
d
(
a1p
2+b1p+c1
a2p2+b2p+c2
)
dp
=
(a1b2 − a2b1) p2 + 2 (a1c2 − a2c1) p+ b1c2 − b2c1
(a2p2 + b2p+ c2)
2 .
(120)
The proof is completed by setting (120) to zero and finding
the solution.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Based on Theorems 2 and 5, the optimal asymptotic secrecy
rate for the MF-AN design is given by
R∗sec, asy = log2
a3γ
2 + b3γ + 1
a4γ2 + b4γ + 1
. (121)
Following a similar approach as in Appendix B, we obtain
the asymptotic secrecy rate of the NS design as
Rsec, asy, null = log2
a5γ + 1
a6γ + 1
. (122)
Performing some simplifications, R∗sec, asy T Rsec, asy, null
is equivalent to
a7γ
3 + b7γ
2 + c7γ T 0. (123)
Then, Theorem 7 is obtained by finding the feasible region
of (123).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Following a similar approach as in Appendix B, when L =
0, K = 1, Ne = 1, and Nt →∞, SINR01, asy in (25) becomes
(124), which is given at the top of the next page.
Also, SINReve, asy in (26) becomes
SINReve, asy =
pγΛ
qγ
(
tr
(
R0E,T
)
tr
(
R̂001
)
− Λ
)
+ tr
(
R̂001
) .
(125)
For secure communication, we require SINR01, asy >
SINReve, asy, which is equivalent to (126) at the top of the
next page.
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R̂llm = PlmτR
l
lm
(
N0INt + τ
(
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk + PEr
l
E,RR
l
E,T
))−1
Rllm
= PlmτR
l
lm
((√
N0INt +
τ√
N0
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)(√
N0INt +
τPEr
l
E,R√
N0
RlE,T
))−1
Rllm
= PlmτR
l
lm
(√
N0INt +
τPEr
l
E,R√
N0
RlE,T
)−1(√
N0INt +
τ√
N0
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
Rllm
(a)
= PlmτR
l
lm
 1√
N0
INt−
τPEr
l
E,R√
N30
RlE,T
(
INt+
τPEr
l
E,R
N0
RlE,T
)−1(√N0INt+ τ√N0
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
Rllm
= PlmτR
l
lm
(
INt + τ
L∑
t=0
PtkR
l
tk
)−1
Rllm (112)
SINR01, asy =
pγ
(
tr2
(
R̂001
)
+ tr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
))
qγtr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
)
+ qγtr
(
R̂001
)
tr
(
R001 − R̂001
)
+ tr
(
R̂001
) . (124)
pγ
(
tr2
(
R̂001
)
+ tr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
))
qγtr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
)
+ qγtr
(
R̂001
)
tr
(
R001 − R̂001
)
+ tr
(
R̂001
) > pγΛ
qγ
(
tr
(
R0E,T
)
tr
(
R̂001
)
− Λ
)
+ tr
(
R̂001
) . (126)
When Nt →∞ and Ne = 1, we have∥∥h0E,1∥∥2∥∥∥ĥ001∥∥∥2 Nt→∞→ tr (R0E,T ) tr(R̂001) (127)(
h0E,1
)H
ĥ001
(
ĥ001
)H
h0E,1
Nt→∞→ Λ. (128)
Exploiting the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain(
h0E,1
)H
ĥ001
(
ĥ001
)H
h0E,1 ≤
∥∥h0E,1∥∥2∥∥∥ĥ001∥∥∥2. (129)
Therefore, we have
tr
(
R0E,T
)
tr
(
R̂001
)
− Λ ≥ 0. (130)
Moreover, based on (5), we have
R001 − R̂001
= R001
(
N0INt + τ
(
P01R
0
01 + PER
0
E,T
))−1
× (N0INt + τPER0E,T )
= R001
(
INt + τP01R
0
01
(
N0INt + τPER
0
E,T
)−1)−1
.
(131)
Since R001 and R
0
E,T are transmit correlation matrices, they
are Hermitian positive-semidefinite matrices. From (5) and
(131), we observe
tr
(
R̂001
)
> 0, tr
(
R001 − R̂001
)
> 0. (132)
Eqs. (130) and (132) indicate that the denominators of both
the left hand and the right hand terms in (126) are positive.
Then, simplifying (126), we obtain (69). This completes the
proof.
APPENDIX H
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Setting R001 = β01INt and R
0
E,T = βEINt , we have from
(10)
R̂001 =
τP01β
2
01
N0 + τ (P01β01 + PEβE)
INt (133)
tr
(
R̂001
)
=
τP01β
2
01Nt
N0 + τ (P01β01 + PEβE)
(134)
tr
((
R001 − R̂001
)
R̂001
)
=
τP01β
3
01 (N0 + τPEβE)Nt
(N0 + τ (P01β01 + PEβE))
2
(135)
tr
(
R001 − R̂001
)
=
β01 (N0 + τPEβE)Nt
N0 + τ (P01β01 + PEβE)
(136)
Λ =
τP01β
2
01βENt
(N0 + τ (P01β01 + PEβE))
2
× (τP01β01 + τPEβENt +N0) (137)
tr
(
R0E,T
)
= βENt. (138)
Substituting (133)–(138) into η1 in (70), recalling Nt →∞,
and simplifying, we obtain
η1 = N
4
t (τP01β01 + τPEβE +N0) (P01β01 − PEβE) .
(139)
This completes the proof.
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